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Abstract 
 
 
Among the proposals for radical reform of social policy are basic income, 
which would pay an unconditional cash benefit to all individuals, and the right 
to work, which would offer guaranteed employment arranged by the state if 
necessary.  This paper examines the macroeconomic consequences of such 
reform proposals.  It sets up a simple Keynesian income-expenditure model that 
includes basic income and the right to work as alternative methods of providing 
social assistance, along with the more traditional approach of paying 
unemployment benefits.  The various schemes are compared and contrasted 
with regard to their implications for employment, stability, distribution, 
efficiency and the government budget.  Potential benefits of basic income or the 
right to work are emphasised, despite the political obstacles to implementing 
them. 
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Introduction 
 
Unemployment has always been among the main causes of poverty in capitalist economies.  
When people become unemployed, they normally enter the 'null-income group' whose 
survival depends on social assistance (Weintraub, 1985).  The fortunes of this group, often 
neglected in economic theory, are critical to social policy and the economy at large.  Most 
income maintenance for the unemployed revolves around cash benefits conditional on 
unemployment or low incomes.  Proposals for radical reform of social policy have 
suggested alternative arrangements, notably basic income and a right to work. 
 
    Basic income can be defined as a cash benefit paid to all individuals regardless of their 
personal characteristics or employment status.  It differs from unemployment benefits in 
that it is not conditional on unemployment; if paid at a high enough level, it enables people 
to survive without having to work.  The academic literature casts basic income in many 
different lights and gives it several names, such as citizen's income, universal grant, 
demogrant, social wage and social dividend (for general discussions, see Clark and 
Kavanagh, 1996; Offe et al., 1996; Parker, 1989; Purdy, 1988; van Parijs, 1992, 1995; 
Walter, 1989).  Viewed narrowly, it could be just a modest social assistance scheme; 
viewed expansively, it could bring fundamental social change through a progressive, 
long-run fall in working hours (van der Veen and van Parijs, 1986).  Arguments for basic 
income, raising diverse economic, political and ethical issues, have portrayed it as a means 
to efficiency, equality, liberty or fraternity. 
 
    Unlike basic income, a right to work or employment guarantee preserves the link 
between employment and income.  Rather than replacing lost income when people become 
unemployed, it provides employment created by the state as employer of last resort (see, for 
example, Delsen, 1997; Minsky, 1986; Minsky and Whalen, 1996-97; Mosler, 1997-98; 
Rustin, 1985, 1987; Sherman, 1995, Chapter 15).  Under a statutory right to work, all 
members of the labour force would be guaranteed employment, so that transfer payments to 
the unemployed would no longer be needed.  Any 'rights' to work might also entail 'duties' 
to work and contribute to the economy (Gorz, 1989, Part III).  The resulting system would 
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reaffirm employment as the prime income source and might have its own inherent virtues in 
promoting social solidarity. 
 
    Economic discussion of social policy reform has mostly taken a neoclassical line, 
focused on microeconomic effects.  Less has been said about macroeconomic effects, and 
yet they are crucial for the short-run functioning of the economy.  This paper uses a simple 
Keynesian income-expenditure model to consider the macroeconomic consequences of 
basic income and a right to work. 
 
 
 
Four methods of income maintenance 
 
Income maintenance schemes can be classified according to two features.  The first is 
whether the scheme is cash-based or work-based.  A cash-based scheme pays out cash 
benefits to replace the income lost through unemployment and makes no attempt to replace 
the employment itself.  Social assistance consists of transfer payments that redistribute 
purchasing power towards the poor.  A work-based scheme, by contrast, aims to keep 
people in work and therefore provides jobs for those who want them.  Successful job 
creation measures will render cash benefits superfluous. 
 
    The second feature is whether arrangements are conditional on unemployment.  Transfer 
payments to the unemployed have usually been triggered by their joblessness (or, 
equivalently, their null-income status) and withdrawn once they return to work.  
Work-based measures could also be conditional on unemployment, with the state providing 
a minimum amount of guaranteed work to the unemployed.  Basic income offers all 
individuals a cash payment unconditional on employment or any other characteristic.  
Likewise, a right to work could offer everyone a minimum amount of work; further work 
above the minimum would be voluntary and subject to the availability of employment. 
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    Combining the two features yields four types of income maintenance scheme, shown in 
Table 1.  Of the four types, only that in the top left-hand corner of the table ± 
unemployment benefits ± is commonly observed.  The other three are unfamiliar in practice 
and have had varying degrees of theoretical discussion. 
 
 
 
Table 1   Types of income maintenance scheme 
 
 
                                                                                            Method of provision 
 
                                                                         Conditional on                      Unconditional 
                                                                         unemployment 
 
 
 
                                               Cash                   Unemployment                    Basic income 
                                                                               benefits 
                   Basis of 
                   provision 
 
                                               Work                Guaranteed work                    Basic work 
 
 
 
 
 
    Basic income, being unconditional, avoids labelling any particular group of benefit 
recipients as dependent on the rest of society.  All citizens receive basic income as an 
entitlement, and there is no means testing or monitoring of personal characteristics.  Ideally, 
basic income would be enough to sustain an adequate but relatively low living standard.  
Most people would continue working, which would not be strictly necessary for subsistence 
but essential for material affluence. 
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    Guaranteed work is provided by the state to anyone unable to find a job in the standard 
labour market.  The state ± the employer of last resort ± creates a separate class of 
guaranteed jobs at low wage, skill and productivity levels.  People still have an incentive to 
find better-paid standard employment, but failing that they can fall back on guaranteed 
work.  Membership of the labour force remains voluntary and carries with it the assurance 
of either employment or guaranteed work.  If cash benefits were abolished, a person would 
have to enter the labour force to acquire a subsistence income.  Guaranteed work endorses 
the link between work and income, imposing a de facto duty to work.  Those excluded from 
the standard labour market must participate in work created especially by the state.  They 
are no longer a null-income group and their wage incomes, although low compared with 
standard employment, are recorded in the national income accounts. 
 
    The final possibility, the work-based counterpart of basic income, can be termed 'basic 
work'.  It offers a uniform minimum amount of work undertaken by all members of the 
labour force.  If basic work was compulsory for the whole able-bodied population, then it 
would be a duty attached to citizenship; otherwise, it could be a condition of entry into the 
labour force and avoidable by those choosing not to work.  Basic work could act as an 
income guarantee providing wages sufficient for a low but adequate living standard.  Those 
wanting higher incomes would supplement their basic work with employment.  An 
argument for basic work could centre on its fostering a public-service, communal spirit and 
its reducing dependency on state benefits: like guaranteed work, it would yield genuine 
wage incomes recorded in the national income accounts.  An obvious argument against 
basic work is that resembles conscripted labour and may thus appear illiberal and 
inefficient. 
 
    The alternatives set out in Table 1 broach wide-ranging practical and ethical issues, 
which go far beyond the scope of the present paper.  Attention here dwells on the 
macroeconomic effects of the schemes within a Keynesian framework. 
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A Keynesian model 
 
The following analysis uses a Keynesian model that expresses income and expenditure as 
functions of employment.  Diagrammatically, the model mirrors the usual Keynesian cross, 
but with employment rather than income on the horizontal axis (see, for example, Nell, 
1992, Chapter 20).  Such a framework can show how various income maintenance schemes 
will influence national income and employment. 
 
    It is convenient to have a model embracing all four schemes in Table 1.  Let M denote 
the income support provided to the unemployed, and V' the average productivity (value 
added per worker per period) of full-time guaranteed and basic work.  If guaranteed and 
basic work operate on a non-profit-making basis with negligible overhead costs, but are 
taxed in the normal way, then net wage income will be (1-t)V', where t is the tax rate.  
Suppose that guaranteed and basic work yield the same net income as the equivalent cash 
benefits, so that (1-t)V' = M.  An unemployed person will receive a net disposable income 
of M, derived from cash benefits, government-created work, or some combination of these. 
 
    Let a (0 < a < 1) denote the degree of universality in social assistance schemes, such that 
a = 0 implies pure conditional measures, a = 1 pure unconditional measures, and 0 < a < 1 
a hybrid case.  Let b (0 < b < 1) denote the degree to which social assistance is work-based, 
such that b = 0 implies pure cash-based measures, b = 1 pure work-based measures, and 
0 < b < 1 a hybrid case.  The four components of social assistance will then provide net 
incomes as follows: unemployment benefits = (1-a)(1-b)M; basic income = a(1-b)M; 
guaranteed work = (1-a)b(1-t)V' = (1-a)bM; basic work = ab(1-t)V' = abM.  When 0 < a < 1 
and 0 < b < 1, guaranteed and basic work have productivities at the lower levels (1-a)bV' 
and abV', which could mean shorter working hours at the same hourly productivity or the 
same working hours with lower work intensity; either way, the worker's engagement in 
work-based social assistance has diminished.  Each unemployed person receives all four 
components of social assistance to give a total of M.  Everyone else receives only the 
unconditional components (basic income and work) to give a total of aM.  Varying a and b 
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will change the composition of social assistance, while holding constant the net income 
support for the unemployed. 
 
    As the universality parameter a and the work-basis parameter b can take the values zero, 
unity or something in between, there are nine possible social assistance schemes in the 
model: four pure cases and five hybrids (see Table 2).  Most actual social assistance adopts 
the pure unemployment benefits case (a = b = 0) in the top left-hand corner of Table 2.  The 
other eight cases remain largely unexplored, though they emerge quite naturally from the 
conceptual distinctions made above.  Each case in Table 2 gives rise to a different version 
of the Keynesian cross, different employment and income levels, and a different mode of 
national income adjustment. 
 
 
Table 2   Nine possibilities for social assistance 
 
 
                                                      b = 0                0 < b < 1                b = 1 
 
 
                          a = 0                  Pure ub               ub/gw                 Pure gw 
 
                       0 < a < 1                 ub/bi             ub/gw/bi/bw            gw/bw 
 
                          a = 1                  Pure bi                bi/bw                  Pure bw 
 
 
 
    Basic work would require that the employed carry out extra work tasks: the time and 
effort involved might reduce their productivity, creating a trade-off.  To allow for this, 
suppose that the productivity of the employed varies with the basic work (abV') they 
undertake.  Let average productivity be V-dabV', where d reflects the adverse effect of the 
basic work (0 < d < 1).  Adding the output from basic work gives a total productivity 
V+(1-d)abV'.  If d = 1, then the employed have fixed total productivities V, and the output 
from basic work merely displaces output from employment.  If d = 0, then there is no 
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displacement, and basic work provides a net addition to output.  If 0 < d < 1, as seems most 
likely, then there is partial but not complete displacement, so that basic work does bring a 
total productivity increase.  By its nature, basic work must entail unskilled, low 
productivity tasks valued chiefly for their income maintenance role, not their output.  
Higher levels of V' would, all the same, help bolster national income. 
 
    In order to uphold the parallel with basic income, basic work will be assumed applicable 
to the whole population T, as a right or duty of citizenship.  The labour force L then 
becomes a subset of T who have registered as seeking further employment; those unable to 
find jobs are entitled to guaranteed work (plus unemployment benefits).  Since employment 
and guaranteed/basic work both yield formally recorded incomes, national income now has 
two components, YE = (V-dabV')E derived from standard employment and YW = 
abV'T+(1-a)bV'(L-E) derived from job creation schemes.  The income side of the model is 
therefore: 
 
(1)                  Y = YE + YW = bV'(aT+(1-a)L) + (V-(1-a+da)bV')E 
   
Basic and guaranteed work ensure that national income cannot be less than bV'(aT+(1-a)L), 
the minimum national income generated when E is zero.  The coefficient on E is now 
adjusted downward below V because of the fall in guaranteed work as E expands and the 
negative productivity effect of basic work.  Setting b = 0 means that work-based social 
assistance has been withdrawn, and the income curve reverts to its usual form Y = VE. 
 
    Work-based measures also alter the expenditure side of the model.  Suppose that 
expenditure patterns from basic and guaranteed work incomes resemble those from wage 
incomes and cash benefits, with a common average propensity to consume (APC) of c1.  
Consumption expenditures from cash benefits and guaranteed/basic work incomes can be 
expressed as CM = c1(a(1-b)MT+(1-a)(1-b)M(L-E)) and CW = c1(1-t)(abV'T+(1-a)bV'(L-E)).  
The income YE from standard employment is divided between wage and non-wage 
incomes, such that k (0 < k < 1) is the non-wage share and 1-k the wage share.  Non-wage 
incomes give rise to an APC of c2, where c2 < c1.  Consumption expenditures from YE will 
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be CE = c3(1-t)(V-dabV')E, where c3 = (1-k)c1+kc2 and all incomes are taxed at the same rate 
t.  Assuming a closed economy, total expenditure X will then be: 
 
              X = CM + CW + CE + I + G + J    
                  = c1(1-t)V'(aT+(1-a)(L-E)) + c3(1-t)(V-dabV')E + I + G + J 
                  = c1(1-t)V'(aT+(1-a)L) + (1-t)(c3(V-dabV')-c1(1-a)V')E + I + G +  J 
 
where I = investment; G = regular government spending on goods and services; J = 
abV'T+(1-a)bV'(L-E) = government spending on job creation.  Although J is motivated by 
income maintenance objectives, it produces real output and must be included alongside G 
as government spending on goods and services.  In view of the unskilled, low-paid, flexible 
character of guaranteed and basic work, the output produced would be more expendable 
than the outputs from G, but would still be formal productive work, presumably with a 
community service aspect. 
 
    The parameters a, b, c1, c2, d, k, t, V and V' all remain constant during the period 
considered, as do relative prices.  Setting Y = X and solving for E and Y yields the 
following steady states: 
 
(2)                 E =           c1(1-t)V'(aT+(1-a)L) + I + G 
                                 (1-c3(1-t))(V-dabV') + c1(1-a)(1-t)V' 
 
(3)       Y =       (aT+(1-a)L)(b-(bc3-c1)(1-t))(V-dabV')V' + (V-(1-a+da)bV') (I + G) 
                                           (1-c3(1-t))(V-dabV') + c1(1-a)(1-t)V' 
 
These general expressions simplify whenever a and b are set to unity or zero.  The four 
pure cases in the corners of Table 2 give the following steady-state values for E and Y: 
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Unemployment benefits (a =  b = 0) 
 
(4)                   E =    c1ML + I + G                       Y =     c1ML + I + G 
                                    (1-c3(1-t))V + c1M                          1-c3(1-t) + c1M/V 
 
Basic income (a = 1, b = 0) 
 
(5)                   E =    c1MT + I + G                       Y =     c1MT + I + G 
                                         (1-c3(1-t))V                                        1-c3(1-t)  
 
 
Guaranteed work (a = 0, b = 1) 
 
(6)             E =       c1(1-t)V'L + I + G              Y =  (1-(c3-c1)(1-t))VV'L + (V-V') (I + G) 
                          (1-c3(1-t))V + c1(1-t)V'                          (1-c3(1-t))V + c1(1-t)V' 
 
Basic work (a = b =1) 
 
(7)               E =     c1(1-t)V'T + I + G              Y =      (1-(c3-c1)(1-t))V'T + I + G 
                              (1-c3(1-t))(V-dV')                                      1-c3(1-t) 
        
 
How do changes in social assistance policy affect employment and national income?  
Partially differentiating E in equation (2) with respect to a and b gives: 
 
                    E  =    c1(1-t)V'(T-L+E) + dbV'(1-c3(1-t))E        >  0 
                    a        (1-c3(1-t))(V-dabV') + c1(1-a)(1-t)V'  
 
     E  =                   daV'(1-c3(1-t))E                         = 0   if a = 0 or d = 0 or both 
     b            (1-c3(1-t))(V-dabV') + c1(1-a)(1-t)V'      >  0   if a >  0 and d >  0 
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    Higher a unambiguously raises E, but higher b raises E only if a and d are both positive, 
in other words, only if there is an unconditional element in social assistance and an adverse 
productivity effect of basic work.  The fall in productivity induced by basic work, which 
might seem unwelcome, has the desirable property of raising steady-state employment.  
Partially differentiating Y in equation (1) with respect to a and b gives: 
 
                   Y =   bV'(T-L) + (1-d)bV'E + (V-(1-a+da)bV') E    >  0 
                   a                                                                       a 
     
                   Y =   aV'(T-dE) + (1-a)V'(L-E) + (V-(1-a+da)bV') E    >  0 
                  b                                                                                    b 
 
Higher a and b unambiguously raise Y for all parameter values.  The effect of a on Y occurs 
mainly through higher aggregate demand and employment, the effect of b mainly through 
the output of basic and guaranteed work.  Generally speaking, moving toward 
unconditional and work-based social assistance will stimulate both employment and 
national income. 
 
    Figure 1 depicts the effects of cash-based and work-based measures on the expenditure 
and income curves.  The cash-based measures in Figure 1(a) leave the Y curve untouched 
(as Y = VE) and raise the X curve through transfer payments.  ;ժ  is the no-social-assistance 
case (intercept I+G; slope c3(1-t)V), where the null-income group have zero expenditure.  
Unemployment benefits rotate ;ժ  upward around the E = L vertical to give Xub (intercept 
c1ML+I+G; slope c3(1-t)V-c1M).  Basic income translates ;ժ  upward to give Xbi (intercept 
c1MT+I+G; slope c3(1-t)V).  Hybrid cases (0 < a < 1; b = 0 in Table 2) produce X curves 
lying between Xub and Xbi. 
 
    The work-based measures in Figure 1(b) match the cash-based measures in form, but 
shift the Y curve instead of the X curve.  <ժ  is the no social assistance case, where Y = VE.  
Guaranteed work rotates <ժ  upward around the E = L vertical, to give Ygw (intercept V'L; 
slope V-V').  Basic work gives Ybw, whose slope depends on the productivity trade-off 
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Figure 1   Cash-based and work-based social assistance 
 
 
(a)  Cash-based 
 
 
 
                       Y 
                                    
                                            
 
                
                                       Xbi                        
                                  
                                                    
                                Xub              
                                            ;ժ  
 
                                       
 
 
                           0                                                        L               E 
 
        
 
(b)  Work-based 
 
 
 
                      Y     
                                                                                      <֥bw 
                                                                                   
 
                
                                                          
                                         Ybw 
 
                                     
 
                                    Ygw 
 
                                       <ժ  
 
                         0                                                          L               E 
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parameter d (intercept V'T; slope V-dV').  If d = 0, then Ybw is an upward translation of <ժ .  If 
d > 0, then a curve such as <֥bw will ensue, with a slope lower than that of <ժ  but greater than 
or equal to that of Ygw.  Hybrid cases (a = 0; 0 < b < 1 in Table 2) will produce Y curves 
lying between Ybw (or <֥bw) and Ygw.  Expenditures will rise when people spend their 
guaranteed and basic work incomes; curves Ygw and Ybw will each have an associated X 
curve raised above the no-social-assistance case.  Work-based approaches, unlike 
income-based ones, promote higher consumption expenditures by raising formally recorded 
incomes, thus moving both Y and X curves upward. 
 
    Figure 2 shows steady-state outcomes for conditional and unconditional schemes.  
Figure 2(a) covers conditional schemes (unemployment benefits and guaranteed work), 
with Ygw and Xub defined as before.  Yub is the Y curve for the unemployment benefits case 
(Y = VE), and Xgw is the X curve for the guaranteed work scheme (intercept 
c1(1-t)V'L+V'L+I+G; slope c3(1-t)V-c1(1-t)V'-V').  Xgw can be downward-sloping if V' is so 
large that the withdrawal of job creation expenditures outweighs the rise in consumption 
expenditures as E increases.  At any given value of E, Xgw will exceed Xub, and Ygw will 
exceed Yub, by a common vertical distance equal to the output and public spending 
associated with guaranteed work.  Hence, in the steady state, Eub =  Egw and Yub <  Ygw, as 
can be seen from equations (4) and (6). 
 
    Figure 2(b) covers unconditional schemes (basic income and work), assuming no adverse 
productivity effects from basic work (d = 0).  Ybi is the Y curve for the basic income case 
(Y = VE), Ybw and Xbi are defined as before, and Xbw is the X curve for the basic work 
scheme (intercept c1(1-t)V'T+V'T+I+G; slope c3(1-t)(V-dV') = c3(1-t)V when d = 0).  As in 
Figure 2(a), the X and Y curves have the same vertical distance between them, which now 
reflects the constant output and public spending associated with basic work: Xbw and Xbi are 
parallel, and so are Ybw and Ybi.  Consequently, when d = 0, then Ebi =  Ebw (> Eub =  Egw) and 
Ybi < Ybw because of the higher productivity from basic work.  When d > 0, however, both 
the Xbw and Ybw curves will rotate downward around their intersections with the vertical 
axis, and the new steady state will have higher employment than the d = 0 case but the 
same national income (see equation (7)).  Lower productivity as d rises yields an exactly  
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Figure 2   Steady-state outcomes 
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compensating rise in E and a constant Y; other things being equal, the steady state moves 
horizontally outward along the dotted arrow in Figure 2(b). 
 
    The hybrid cases when 0 < a < 1 or 0 < b < 1 produce intermediate outcomes between 
the pure cases considered above.  With each case having its own Keynesian cross, the basic 
Keynesian arguments about aggregate demand must rely heavily on social policy measures.  
Of key importance is the way that the various schemes will influence stability, employment 
patterns, the income distribution, the government budget, and economic efficiency. 
 
 
 
Stability 
  
The stability of national income and employment turns on how the steady state responds to 
changes in investment or other autonomous expenditures.  One should therefore look at the 
relation between the parameters a and b and the size of the income and employment 
multipliers.   
 
    The income multiplier nY can be obtained by partially differentiating Y (from equation 
(3)) with respect to I: 
 
(8)             nY  =        Y      =                  V-(1-a+da)bV'   
                                 I            (1-c3(1-t))(V-dabV') + c1(1-a)(1-t)V' 
 
The employment multiplier nE, which relates the final change in E to the initial employment 
impact of a change in I, can be obtained by partially differentiating E (from equation (2)) 
with respect to I and then multiplying by the productivity of the jobs created through 
investment spending.  If employment in investment-good industries has the same 
productivity as in other industries (V-dabV'), then: 
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(9)             nE  =    (V-dabV')   E    =                        V-dabV' 
                                                I          (1-c3(1-t))(V-dabV') + c1(1-a)(1-t)V'  
 
Comparing equations (8) and (9) shows that nY and nE are equal whenever a = 1 or b = 0 or 
both, in other words, whenever there is no guaranteed work scheme.  For cases with a 
guaranteed work scheme, nE will exceed nY: employment rises at the expense of guaranteed 
work and the associated income, pulling down the income multiplier but leaving the 
employment multiplier unchanged.  Cash transfers or basic work do not incur this income 
loss as employment rises, and so nY and nE are equal. 
 
    Both nY and nE are increasing functions of a, which means that greater universality in 
social assistance will raise the income and employment multipliers and reduce the stability 
of national income and employment.  Conditional measures, serving as automatic 
stabilisers, flatten out the X curves in Figures 1 and 2 and dampen the variability of the 
steady state.  The vital difference from unconditional measures is that cash transfers or 
guaranteed work actively replace employment rather than passively supplement it: a 
recession calls forth social assistance as an endogenous feature of the model, whereas an 
expansion curtails social assistance.  Governments wishing primarily to stabilise the 
economy might therefore favour conditional measures. 
 
    Changes in b have almost the opposite effect of changes in a: nY is either a decreasing 
function of b (when a < 1) or invariant with respect to b (when a = 1); likewise, nE either 
decreases with b (when 0 < a < 1, d > 0) or stays invariant (when a = 0 or 1 or d = 0).  
Generally speaking, a shift toward work-based social assistance will stabilise national 
income and employment or, at worst, leave matters unchanged.  The stabilising effect on Y 
stems from the conditional component of social assistance, present when a < 1.  Higher b 
implies a switch from unemployment benefits, which add nothing to national income, to 
guaranteed work, which adds formally recorded output and income.  The slope of the Ygw 
curve falls (see Figure 2(a)), and Y becomes more stable as a result.  Raising b affects the 
employment multiplier nE only in cases where a and d exceed zero, that is, where basic 
work reduces the productivity of employment.  If so, then raising b will rotate the X and Y 
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curves downward around their intersections with the vertical axis, giving a lower 
employment multiplier (and a further fall in the income multiplier).  On the whole, job 
creation schemes should stabilise national income and employment. 
 
 
 
Employment patterns 
 
Advocates of basic income have sometimes claimed that it would encourage a more even 
employment distribution (Purdy, 1988).  The argument hinges on attitudes to work when 
everyone receives basic income as an alternative or supplement to wage incomes.  People 
would no longer regard full-time work as their only income source and would be freer to 
choose the type and extent of work they undertake.  Many people may today be working 
longer hours than they would wish, while others have no work at all; basic income could 
encourage shorter hours and thereby release working time for the unemployed.  Such an 
argument invokes microeconomic factors; basic income lets people assert their work 
preferences and resist constraints on working hours. 
 
    Other, macroeconomic, factors may also bear on the employment distribution (Jackson, 
1991-2).  When social assistance is conditional (a < 1), employment income YE is an 
increasing function of productivity V, but when social assistance is unconditional (a = 1), 
YE is independent of V.  Aggregate profits, expressible as P =  kYE ± F  where F denotes 
fixed rental incomes, are positively related to YE.  With conditional social assistance, 
employers can boost their aggregate profits by raising V and concentrating working time 
among a subset of the labour force.  Employment will fall, E being a decreasing function of 
V in equation (2).  Conditional social assistance, which ties government spending (and thus 
aggregate demand) to employment practices, creates collective incentives for employers to 
maintain a skewed employment distribution.  The outcome will be socially divisive: profit 
recipients and the job-secure will gain higher incomes, others will lose their jobs.  
Unconditional social assistance, however, leaves YE and P invariant with respect to V and 
removes the incentive to concentrate employment.  Basic income and work would 
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encourage shorter working hours, lower work intensity and higher employment than would 
prevail under conditional social assistance.  Whether these macroeconomic incentives have 
great practical significance is perhaps doubtful, given that individual employers may be 
unaware of the collective interests involved.  But the harmony between employers' (macro) 
and workers (micro) incentives suggests that unconditional income maintenance should 
foster a more even employment distribution. 
 
    Guaranteed and basic work would change employment patterns in one immediate 
respect, for they would constitute a new economic sector distinct from other employment.  
This might have unpalatable results: people in state-sponsored jobs could find themselves 
relegated to a lower social status, akin to the current status of the long-term unemployed.  
Such divisions are typical of economies with skewed employment distributions and chronic 
inequality.  Work-based social assistance could at least ensure that everyone produces real 
output, appears in the national income accounts and pays direct taxes.  Some people would 
have low productivities, but no social group would be sidelined as an idle underclass 
wholly dependent on other people's tax payments.  Unlike 'workfare' schemes, where the 
unemployed work for welfare benefits, a right to work would offer genuine work, albeit in 
low-productivity jobs designed specifically as income maintenance.  Basic work could 
spread the low-productivity state-sponsored jobs over the whole population and further 
reduce the distinctions among social groups.   
 
    Although work-based income maintenance would blur existing social distinctions, the 
two-tier employment pattern might set up a division between 'real' jobs derived from 
spontaneous consumer demand and 'artificial' jobs created by the state for purposes of 
social assistance.  Since the 'real' jobs would be mostly in the private sector and the 
'artificial' jobs in the public sector, the division could spill over into a broader private/public 
split assigning lower status to public activities.  Job-creation schemes run the risk of 
lowering the standing of the public sector as it becomes linked with low-productivity, 
low-paid activities (Davidson and Davidson, 1996, pp. 128-130).  Keynesian economists, 
wary of job-creation programmes, have often preferred a less direct approach based on 
sustaining aggregate demand.  This would not provide a statutory right to work, but it 
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would avoid the cleavage between 'real' and 'artificial' jobs and buttress the status of the 
public sector.  A Keynesian full-employment policy is a special case of the present model, 
where a = 0, b = 1, and V = V', so that Y = VL (from equation (3)): the distinction between 
employment and guaranteed work vanishes, and the government simply makes sure that its 
regular spending on goods and services is enough to give full employment.  The policies 
discussed here, however, presuppose that unemployment will persist.  To protect the image 
of its regular activities, a government involved in job creation would have to stress the 
difference between regular public-sector employment and work-based social assistance. 
 
    One way to raise the status of guaranteed and basic work, as well as to improve their 
effectiveness as income maintenance schemes, would be to maximise their productivity V' 
and minimise the gap between V' and V.  At first sight, it might seem that raising V' would 
damage overall productivity if d > 0 and basic work displaces standard employment.  For 
economies below full employment, this is not the case; E and Y in equations (2) and (3) are 
increasing functions of V', whatever the value of d.  Higher V' will elicit a rise in 
employment sufficient to outweigh any productivity losses.  As V' rises (and V-dabV' falls), 
the employment distribution will become more equal.  There will be higher employment, 
but each employed person will have lower productivity (that is, shorter working hours or 
lower work intensity).  Raising the productivity of guaranteed and basic work can reduce 
work disparities directly, by narrowing the V-V' gap, and indirectly, by diminishing the 
skewness of the employment distribution.  The income and employment multipliers in 
equations (8) and (9) are decreasing functions of V'.  Besides expanding output, higher 
productivity in guaranteed and basic work will also stabilise the economy. 
 
    Basic work has a paradoxical relationship with employment.  It seems intuitive that a 
stronger displacement effect, with a higher value of d, should create a trade-off between 
basic work and employment.  For each individual worker this may be true, but it does not 
extend to the whole economy.  Equation (2) shows that higher levels of d will raise 
steady-state employment: the worse the impact of basic work on productivity, the higher 
the number of standard jobs created.  The displacement effect of basic work may well bring 
benefits insofar as it evens out the employment distribution.  Higher d will also narrow the 
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gap between V' and V-dabV', improving the relative position of basic work.  Such benefits 
might be acquired at a cost, because Y in equation (3) is a decreasing function of d 
whenever basic work exists alongside guaranteed work (0 < a < 1, b > 0).  If, however, 
basic work is the only work-based social assistance (a = 1, b > 0), then Y becomes 
independent of d: as d rises, the increased employment exactly offsets the reduced 
productivity (as shown in Figure 2(b)).  What seems an obviously detrimental fall in 
productivity will raise employment and even out the employment distribution without 
reducing national income. 
 
 
 
Income distribution 
 
Cash benefits transfer purchasing power from taxpayers to benefit recipients.  According to 
the national accounts, this does not redistribute incomes, as real economic activity remains 
unchanged, though it does rearrange expenditures.  The only true income redistribution will 
arise in a roundabout fashion, from basic income schemes.  If basic income brings a more 
even employment distribution as average working hours decline, then the income 
distribution too will become more even. 
 
    Work-based social assistance, by contrast, adds a new component YW to national income, 
through the incomes generated from guaranteed and basic work.  People previously in the 
null-income group now have recorded incomes and enter the income distribution.  Income 
will be equalised by raising incomes at the bottom end of the distribution, rather than by 
straight reallocation.  As with cash benefits, there may be some effects on the income 
distribution if employment patterns change, and again the unconditional approach (basic 
work) should have a more egalitarian impact than the conditional one (guaranteed work).  
Of the four income maintenance schemes in Table 1, basic work should do the most to 
equalise personal incomes, and unemployment benefits the least. 
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    Further redistribution may occur between wages and profit.  Social assistance, in 
softening the blow of unemployment, should improve workers' bargaining power.  All 
income maintenance schemes, compared with the laissez-faire alternative, will consolidate 
real wages and protect the wage share in national income.  Unconditional schemes are 
generally assumed to provide a stronger bargaining position for workers than conditional 
schemes (Groot and Peeters, 1997).  Unemployment benefits and guaranteed work are 
available only to members of the labour force, on the understanding that they are seeking 
and will accept employment; the authorities may urge them to take any low-paid jobs.  
Basic income or work, on the other hand, is unconnected with membership of the labour 
force and does not imply that recipients ought to be employed.  Workers can be choosier 
about jobs; since they will always receive income maintenance, they have greater freedom 
to opt for shorter working hours, lower work intensity and higher real wages.  In the present 
model, basic income or work should raise the wage share in employment incomes, 1-k, and 
reduce the non-wage share, k.  As is usually true within a Keynesian/Kaleckian framework, 
a fall in the non-wage share raises national income and employment, because the APC from 
wage income exceeds that from non-wage income: in equations (2) and (3), E and Y are 
increasing functions of c3 and decreasing functions of k.  Unconditional social assistance 
should benefit workers through both higher employment, other things being equal, and 
higher real wages. 
 
    A possible counterargument is that social assistance for workers will act as a wage 
subsidy, allowing employers to cut wages (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1988; Iacobacci and 
Seccareccia, 1989; Seccareccia, 1991).  This sceptical view normally pertains to a 
minimum guaranteed income, where cash benefits make up the difference between 
low-wage incomes and a minimum socially acceptable income level.  Low-paid workers 
then have little reason to bargain for improved wages, as a fall in cash benefits will nullify 
any wage rise.  With basic income, however, social assistance is not linked with the wage 
rate and should not impair workers' bargaining incentives.  People who receive basic 
income may choose to work shorter hours and earn lower total employment incomes, but 
they still have the incentive to maximise their hourly wage rate and, thus, the wage share in 
national income.   
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    Benefits for workers often mean costs for employers, and a fall in the non-wage income 
share would prompt employers to oppose unconditional schemes (although the rise in YE as 
k falls will cushion the effect of lower k on aggregate profits P =  kYE ± F).  Employers will 
gain most from social assistance contingent on their own employment decisions, which 
gives them extra leverage over workers and binds public spending to their recruitment and 
work practices.  They will also gain from cash-based measures, since work-based social 
assistance operating on a non-profit-making basis could remove avenues for profitable 
private-sector activity.  This assumes that job creation programmes stand apart from the 
private sector and do not generate private profit.  Employers will be more sympathetic to 
job creation measures the bigger the profit share in YW.  The ideal case for employers would 
be a privatised 'workfare' system (or equivalent 'training' or 'work experience' schemes) 
where the unemployed work in the private sector for transfer payments and produce a 
marketed output the generates pure profit income.  The profit share in YW would then be 
unity and the unemployed would be providing free services to their 'employers'.  One would 
hope that employer influence over social assistance would never go as far as to capture the 
job creation programme and exploit it as a source of cheap, publicly subsidised labour. 
 
 
 
The government budget 
 
Arguments against basic income frequently point out its high cost, which may cause 
various problems, such as the difficulty of getting electoral support for high taxes, the 
possibility of work disincentives, and the supposed adverse effects of larger budget deficits.  
Given these concerns, it is worth looking at the government budget within the present 
model.   
 
    The tax rate t has been held constant for all income maintenance schemes.  Government 
revenue can be expressed as R = tY = tYE + tYW, and government spending as S =  G + J + B 
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=  G + YW + B, where B = a(1-b)MT+(1-a)(1-b)M(L-E) = total spending on cash benefits.  
Under the assumption that M = (1-t)V', the budget deficit will be: 
 
(10)                            D = S - R = G + (1-t)YW + B - tYE 
 
                                = aMT + (1-a)M(L-E) + G - t(V-dabV')E 
 
Interest here focuses on how D varies with changes in a and b. 
 
    Intuitively, for a constant tax rate, one would expect unconditional measures to produce 
higher budget deficits than conditional ones, although the higher employment with 
unconditional measures might offset this.  Partially differentiating D with respect to a, one 
can show that D/a   as 1-(1-t)c3-tc1  0 (see Figure 3).  Under normal parameter 
values, where c1, c2, c3 and t fall between zero and unity, the deficit will be an increasing 
function of a, as expected.  An exception arises if c1 =  c2 =  c3 = 1, in which case D/a = 0 
and the government has a constant budget surplus of I.  Conceivably, when c1 or c2 exceeds 
unity and is sufficiently large, a rise in a could reduce the budget deficit: the revenue gain 
from higher employment would then outweigh the greater cost of unconditional measures.  
This seems unlikely in practice, but high APC values will lessen the budgetary impact of 
basic income and work.  The greater employment and tax revenues from unconditional 
schemes will always counteract the costs of the generous social assistance on offer. 
 
    Increasing b, a shift toward work-based social assistance, will either reduce the deficit or 
leave it unchanged.  Partially differentiating D with respect to b, one finds that D/b < 0 if 
0 < a < 1, d > 0 and 1-(1-t)c3-tc1 > 0.  A movement toward work-based social assistance 
will reduce the budget deficit whenever basic work coexists with guaranteed work and has 
a negative productivity effect.  In other cases, the budget deficit will stay the same. 
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 Figure 3   Conditional social assistance and the budget deficit 
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    Since income and expenditure are endogenous, the budget deficit varies systematically 
with employment.  Higher employment raises revenue, reduces conditional expenditures 
and narrows the budget deficit until at some point the budget will balance.  Setting R = S in 
the model gives the balanced-budget employment level: 
 
                              E*  =       (aT+(1-a)L)(1-t)V' + G 
                                          t(V-dabV') + (1-a)(1-t)V' 
 
Employment above E* yields a budget surplus, employment below E* a deficit.  Raising a 
and shifting to unconditional measures unambiguously raises E* and causes budgetary 
balance to occur at higher employment levels.  Raising b and shifting to work-based 
measures has no effect on E* when a or d is zero but otherwise raises E*.  The highest 
values of E* therefore derive from unconditional, work-based social assistance. 
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    Other things being equal, conditional schemes give budgetary balance at lower 
employment and national income levels than unconditional schemes.  If the government 
espouses budgetary balance as a policy objective, then it may be less willing to pursue full 
employment when social assistance is conditional.  A conditional social assistance budget 
can never, on its own, balance at full employment: spending drops to zero when E = L, 
while revenue stays positive, and the budget must be in surplus.  Unconditional social 
assistance, which severs the link between public spending and unemployment, can be 
designed so that it breaks even at or near full employment.  Balanced-budget policies 
should then be less deflationary and produce higher employment and national incomes.  
From a Keynesian angle, of course, the rationale of budgetary balance is dubious; policy 
should really be aiming for other, more important objectives.  Nonetheless, budgetary 
balance animates a good deal of public policy, and in this climate the detaching of social 
assistance spending from employment might produce less deflationary policy stances. 
 
 
 
Efficiency 
 
Unconditional social assistance schemes can easily be portrayed as reducing work 
incentives, distorting labour markets and causing inefficiency.  The same goes for 
work-based schemes: work organised as job creation by the state falls outside the usual run 
of labour markets and lacks the profit incentive of private-sector employment.  Tasks 
performed through job creation programmes might, it would seem, be better performed 
through standard employment organised on competitive principles. 
 
    The idea that unconditional and work-based social assistance are inefficient emerges 
from comparisons with a hypothetical competitive economy in which markets possess the 
efficiency properties predicted by neoclassical welfare economics.  This somewhat misses 
the point of social assistance measures intended for economies with chronic unemployment.  
The goal is not to supplant or interfere with employment, but to offset unemployment in an 
economy operating more or less permanently below full capacity.  Paying cash benefits will 
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enhance macroeconomic efficiency if it upholds aggregate demand and raises employment.  
Job creation will enhance macroeconomic efficiency if it allows people to raise their 
productivity above zero and earn genuine incomes.  Social assistance should not threaten or 
dislodge current employment practices, but fill the holes resulting from unemployment.  
Macroeconomic slackness, allied with microeconomic tightness, is the hallmark of modern 
capitalist economies, as distinct from alternative economic systems (Nell, 1991).  Chronic 
unemployment engenders the need for social assistance, together with the space for public 
intervention to improve macroeconomic efficiency.   
 
    By efficiency criteria, work-based social assistance schemes seem better than cash-based 
ones, because they yield higher employment and national income, all else being equal.  
They are seldom favoured by economists, though, and are adopted only with reluctance.  
Traditionally, the United States has resorted to job creation programmes more often than, 
say, the United Kingdom, but this follows more from the American ethos of self-reliance 
than from any faith in state intervention (Ashton, 1986).  The basic problem facing job 
creation programmes is that they contravene the operating mode of capitalist economies, 
where demand is scarce and employers provide jobs to meet demand, not as a right or duty.  
An employment guarantee would reverse the usual ordering of things ± it manipulates 
demand to the requirements of workers, not workers to the requirements of demand.  Job 
creation goes against the grain of capitalist economies whose 'flexibility' depends on scarce 
demand and chronic unemployment. 
 
    Work-based social assistance reflects an inconsistency in the government's outlook.  If 
the authorities are worried about unemployment and willing to create jobs to alleviate it, 
then why did they let it arise in the first place?  Why did they not ensure that aggregate 
demand was sufficient to get the economy at or near full employment?  The prevalence of 
unemployment betokens a casual attitude toward macroeconomic efficiency.  Employers 
will be more concerned with microeconomic matters such as their profit rates and 
bargaining power over workers.  Governments may be nominally striving for full 
employment but in practice swayed by free-market doctrines and the sectional interests of 
employers.  As Kalecki (1943) observed, the deflationary stance of employers will 
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normally keep the economy below full capacity, even when the government pays lip service 
to Keynesian economics.  The social assistance policy most congenial to employers will be 
subsistence-level unemployment benefits, which minimise public intervention, tie social 
assistance to employment and produce the lowest employment rate.  Although other 
methods might seem superior on grounds of macroeconomic efficiency, they are liable to 
remain only hypothetical cases. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Keynesian economics demonstrates that demand management could minimise the size of 
the null-income group in capitalist economies and curb the need for social assistance.  
Policy reforms such as basic income schemes or job creation programmes should not 
therefore be viewed as replacements for demand management.  Ideally, in a country where 
successful demand management ensures a high and stable employment rate, social 
assistance measures would be dealing with limited poverty affecting a small subset of the 
population. 
 
    Even so, it is still desirable to choose measures that will sustain output and reduce 
inequality.  A Keynesian perspective on social assistance can highlight macroeconomic 
properties omitted from neoclassical analyses.  Radical reforms of social assistance would 
have some attractive macroeconomic features: work-based measures would raise output and 
employment, and unconditional measures would encourage a more even income 
distribution.  Such policies, as a supplement to demand management, could raise the 
economy's macroeconomic efficiency, redistribute employment and prevent excessive 
income disparities. 
 
    Whatever their advantages, radical reforms of social assistance would face obstacles 
from employers wanting to enlarge profits and maintain control over workers.  Employer 
interests will steer social assistance policy toward the least expansionary and least 
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redistributive of the various possibilities, namely conditional cash benefits paid at 
subsistence level.  Arguments for higher benefits, unconditional measures or a right to work 
will meet strong political and institutional barriers ± the same barriers that have blocked the 
use of Keynesian policies in recent years. 
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